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This paper considers the link between arms spending and economic growth for 
developing countries, in particular whether high spending on arms is likely to have a 
negative effect on economic growth and what benefits that might be gained by reducing 
it. The literature is complex and difficult to summarize, with studies differing 
theoretically, in the empirical methods they use, in the coverage of countries and time 
series, and in their quality and significance. Nevertheless, the paper argues that the 
empirical analyses suggests that there is little or no evidence for a positive effect on 
economic growth and that it is more likely to have a negative effect, or at best no significant 
impact at all. Thus, reducing arms and military spending need not be costly and can 
contribute to, or at the very least provide the opportunity for, improved economic 
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1. Introduction 
 
Military spending is an important issue for the international economy. It is an expenditure 
by governments that has influence beyond the resources it takes up, especially when it 
leads to or facilitates conflicts. At the same time most countries need some level of 
security to deal with internal and external threats, but these can certainly have 
opportunity costs as they can prevent money being used for other purposes that might 
improve the pace of development. Such issues are particularly important for developing 
countries, as in the post Cold War world most wars have been internal and have involved 
the poorest countries and this is unlikely to change.  
 
When governments undertake military spending, they provide wages and salaries and 
cover other expenses for the armed forces and procure arms for them. Unfortunately the 
only reliable data that is available is on military spending and so in reviewing the 
literature we simply have to recognise that arms transfers are an important component of 
military spending. In developing countries it is very likely that the arms will be imported, 
particularly any advanced weapon systems, and hence will become a drain on precious 
reserves of foreign exchange. This suggests that the opportunity cost of military spending 
is likely to be higher than simply the expenditure, once arms transfer are taken into 
account. 
 
With the end of the cold war there were considerable reductions in military expenditure, 
although not consistently across all regions. However, as the SIPRI Yearbooks show 
shows in more recent years the declining trend has bottomed out and military 
expenditures are increasing. While there have been conflicts, with internal conflict being 
a major concern for the developing world and a few major international conflicts, the 
major pressure to increase military spending have not been the result of obvious strategic 
needs, but of internal pressures by vested interests. 
 
General trends do of course always hide more complex patterns. Some countries have 
increased military spending because of local insecurity and in some cases due to the 
encouragement from arms producing companies pushing for arms exports. There has also 
been continued use of economic arguments to justify security expenditures, or to argue 
against reductions. Even within the developing country group there is a real heterogeneity 
of countries, in terms of their stage of development, nature of development, the state of 
their neighbours, their military burden and the degree of military involvement in the state.  
 
 
2. Review of Research Issues 
 
Research in this area has to deal with a number of important data availability, 
measurement, methodology and theoretical issues:  
 
Data Availability and Measurement Problems  
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It is important to treat the published military expenditure data with care, especially when 
looking at developing countries. There are numerous problems with the data: definitions, 
coverage, accuracy etc which make it particularly difficult to use figures for comparison 
across countries or to aggregate to larger groups. There is also growing evidence that 
important amounts of security expenditure do not enter the accounts or budgets of 
developing countries
1. Such problems are also reflected in the fact that different data 
sources, SIPRI, ACDA, IISS, IMF and World Bank, can give markedly different numbers.
2.  
 
Such differences are particularly important for cross section analyses of countries, but not so 
much for time series data. If looking over time, the concern is with the changes rather than 
the absolute or relative values of variables and as long as the definitions do not change 
significantly and systematically one can be relatively confident of the analysis. In most cases 
researchers are left with only the published sources to use and these are at least the products 
of attempts to achieve consistency.
3 There can be large differences in the reliability of data 
across countries and not all arms transfers necessarily show up in the defence statistics. 
Developing countries may also differ in the way in which the treat or define military related 
aid, the fungibility of aid, and the way in which arms sales are financed (Brzoska, 1994).  
 
In an ideal world, we would be able to use military procurement budgets, as this clearly 
reflects spending on arms transfers, however, such data are generally not available for 
developing countries, or if they are of questionable reliability. In fact there is some 
evidence that arms imports may not even be included in military spending figures in 




Applied work this is usually restricted to economic growth rather than development because 
of the problems of defining and measuring development 
4. A theoretical model is important 
                                            
1  This  can  be  simply  because  of  the  different  conventions  or  attempts  to  "massage"  the  figures  using 
mechanisms such as double -bookkeeping, extra budgetary accounts, highly aggregated budget categories, 
military assistance, and foreign exchange manipulation. In some developing countries, the military has a 
much wider remit (for example, they are involved in building projects with social outcomes eg building 
roads, hospitals etc, or take part in what would more normally be considered civilian police duties). 
 
2 The problems of collecting military spending data are reflected in the copious footnotes accompanying the 
SIPRI Yearbook data. See SIPRI (2007) for most recent. The most extreme case was Argentina in 1982 where 
the IISS military expenditure figure and that published by the IMF differed by 1034% 
 
3 Even if data are comparable, the use of the exchange rate to put them into a common currency is not without 
its problems, as it will not reflect the different relative prices of the categories of military expenditure and the 
different  compositions  across countries. The  Summers  Heston dataset  provide data  for a  cross section of 
countries which have been adjusted to take account of these problems, but in most cases researchers focus upon 
standardised data such as the share of military expenditure in GDP or GNP. http://pwt.econ.upenn.edu/ 
Alan Heston, Robert Summers and Bettina Aten, Penn World Table Version 6.2, Center for International 
Comparisons of Production, Income and Prices at the University of Pennsylvania, September 2006. 
4 The former is, of course, only a necessary condition for the latter and the starting point for any such analysis 
should really be some theoretical understanding of the links between the two (Brauer , 1993). Similarly, it is   4 
for any empirical study but much of economic theory does not have an explicit role for 
military spending as a distinctive economic activity. However, this has not prevented the 
development of theoretical analyses as discussed in Dunne & Coulomb (2008). The 
dominant neoclassical approach sees the state as a rational actor which balances the 
opportunity costs and security benefits of military spending in order to maximise a well 
defined national interest reflected in a societal social welfare function. Arms spending can 
then be seen as a public good and the economic effects on military expenditure will be 
determined by its opportunity cost, the trade off between it and other spending. Early models 
of economic growth, which assume exogenous technical change, have been extended, to 
allow for the effects of changes in education and technology that produce endogenous 
growth.  
 
The Keynesian and Institutionalist approach sees a proactive state which uses military 
spending as one aspect of state spending to increase output through multiplier effects in the 
presence of ineffective aggregate demand. In this way increased military spending can lead 
to increased capacity utilisation, increased profits and hence increased investment and 
growth. The Institutionalist approach combines a Keynesian perspective with a focus on the 
way in which high military spending can lead to industrial inefficiencies and to the 
development of a powerful interest group composed of individuals, firms and organisations 
who benefit from defence spending,  usually referred to as the military industrial complex 
(MIC). The MIC increases military expenditure through internal pressure within the state 
even when there is no threat to justify such expenditures.  
 
Finally, the Marxist approach sees the role of military spending in capitalist development as 
important though contradictory. There are a number of strands to the approach which differ 
in their treatment of crisis, the extent to which they see military expenditure as necessary to 
capitalist development, and the role of the MIC in class struggle. One offshoot of this 
approach has provided the only theory in which military spending is both important in itself 
and an integral component of the theoretical analysis, the underconsumptionist approach. 
This sees military spending as necessary to maintain capitalism and prevent stagnation.  
Monopolistic companies produce goods and control labour costs leading to inadequate 
consumption, military spending is a wasteful way –in the sense of not creating any further  
output, of creating demand to allow companies to sell their goods and realise their profits.  
 
 
3. How Arms Transfers and Military Spending Influence Economic Growth 
 
In empirical work the fact that there is no agreed theory of growth among economists 
means that there is no standard framework that military spending can be fitted into. 
Clearly, in developing countries military spending conflict, economic capacity 
                                                                                                                                  
important to recognise that military spending is only one aspect of militarism in a society and is only a measure 
of inputs rather than output (Smith, 1983). 
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(education, governance, institutions, natural resources) all interact to influence growth
5. 
The theoretical work has allowed the identification of a number of channels through which 
military spending can impact on the economy. The relative importance and sign of these 
effects and the overall impact on growth can only be ascertained by empirical analysis. 
 
•  Labour: An important problem in developing countries is creating adequate skilled 
and educated labour as the economy develops. Military spending can have both 
positive and negative effects. The military can train soldiers and conscripts with 
valuable technical and administrative skills which they take into civilian life. It can 
also have modernising effect, with organisational skills and modern attitudes tending 
to break up social rigidities. On the other hand these effects may be insignificant and 
the military may attract scarce skilled labour and valuable resources away from the 
civilian industrial sector and place a fetter on growth. The transferability of skills 
may be limited and the military may be no more, or less, modern than civil 
institutions. Military spending might also be at the expense of education and training 
expenditures (Deger, 1985; Nabe, 1983). 
 
•  Capital: Military spending can have positive or negative effects on both savings and 
investment. It is argued that if increases in military expenditure are funded by 
taxation, then if these expenditures are reduced in the future savings propensities 
may increase. In developing countries, however, raising new revenue from taxation 
can be difficult, thus military expenditure may be funded by increased money supply 
which may lead to inflation which can reduce savings. A direct impact can result 
from military expenditure being directly at the expense of education and health, 
requiring increased private provision and lowering private savings Again the impact 
of military expenditure on investment is an empirical question. On the one hand it is 
hypothesised that it can crowd out investment. On the other hand it can boost 
demand, output and profits and lead to increased investment (other forms of 
government expenditure could also have the same impact). It is possible, however, 
that bottlenecks could prevent any significant positive effect. In addition, the effects 
of infrastructural investment by the military can be either to benefit industry, or be 
purely of military value remote and irrelevant to the civilian sector (Smith & Smith, 
1980; Deger, 1986). 
 
•  Technology:  Imports of arms can introduce advanced product and process 
technology to local industry, particularly if offset deals mean that local production 
takes place through licensing and this could have positive externalities for the rest of 
industry particularly. The will obviously depend on the degree of development and 
the existence of an advanced sector, with trained and educated workforce and 
support industry. On the other hand poor countries may not have the skilled workers 
and technicians and the offset based companies may use mainly expatriots, having 
                                            
5 Indeed, many poor countries, even those with civil wars, spend relatively little on the 
military. In particular many African countries have low military burdens, but there are 
other obstacles to growth (Collier, 2007). 
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little impact on the local economy and being unsustainable once the order is 
fulfilled. Alternatively it could create an advanced production sector with little 
linkage to the rest of the country and dependent on government for support.  (Brauer 
and Dunne, 2006). 
 
•  External relations: The impact of military expenditure on the Balance of Payments 
will depend upon whether or not a country produces arms and whether or not it 
receives military related aid. In most developing countries imports of weapons will 
place a huge burden on the economy, through using scarce foreign exchange, and 
will make trade deficits difficult to avoid. This may be offset by military related aid, 
exports of arms and import substitution, but in general military spending is likely to 
be a burden on the trade balance. In addition, evidence suggests that military related 
debt in developing countries is substantial and that the financial burden of earlier 
arms imports via debt service has grown over time. On the other hand the military 
may provide security from threats, encourage foreign investment, and have links 
with foreign powers with an interest in the region that can be beneficial to trade, 
investment and aid. However, this must be weighed against the possibility of 
involvement in conflict and the damaging effects multinational investment and aid 
can have on weak client economies (Brauer & Dunne, 2002, Brzoska 1983).  
 
•  Socio-Political: Military expenditure may provide the conditions under which 
development can take place. The military may provide control and discipline of 
labour, reduce internal conflict, and be a modernising influence. As discussed above, 
they can impart discipline on conscripts, making them more suited to industrial 
labour when they leave the forces, and can provide skills which can be of value in 
the civil sector. It is, however, possible that the military sector and its technology is 
capital intensive and so far removed from the rest of the economy as to impart little 
of value in terms of spin offs. It may also take skilled labour away from the civil 
sector and military regimes may be conservative, corrupt and inefficient and a fetter 
on economic development (Scheetz, 2002; Smith & Smith, 1980).  
 
•  Debt: Military expenditure has been considered as an important variable in 
explaining the rise of foreign debt in a number of developing countries, 
suggesting that this has led to reduced economic growth. The relationship 
between military expenditures and external debt can be of two forms. In general, 
as a budget item, military expenditure creates the need for funding. If a rise in 
military expenditure, say, cannot be financed through taxation, it will create a 
deficit. This may be financed in four different ways: printing money, using 
foreign exchange reserves, borrowing abroad and borrowing domestically. Each 
of these methods has some limits and implications, which are widely discussed in 
the literature
6. Although there are links between the implications of methods used, 
as a first approximation, the methods of deficit financing are associated with 
different macroeconomic imbalances: money printing with inflation; foreign 
reserve use with the onset of exchange crises; foreign borrowing with an external 
                                            
6 See for a recent example Dunne et al (2003),   7 
debt crisis. Debt can also influence the interest rate which may feedback on 
investment. (Dunne et al , 2004; Brzoska, 1994) 
 
•  Conflicts: An interesting literature has developed that looks at the natures of 
conflicts, the extent to which they are encouraged by military expenditure. Clearly 
the costs of conflict are high and can be made higher through higher military 
expenditure (IANSA et al 2007);. But it is not that straightforward, as military 
spending and arms races don’t inevitably lead to conflict and it might be that it is 
the underlying causes of conflict that are driving the observed expenditures. In 
addition, some of the most damaging and bloody wars have been achieved with 
relatively little in the way of funds or arms transfers (eg Rwanda) (Collier, 2007; 
Murdoch and Sandler 2004). 
 
•  Demand: Clearly military spending in common with any form of government 
expenditure will have effects on aggregate demand and in situations of less than full 
employment will lead to increased output, with income multiplier effects and 
accelerator effects through investment. Developing countries are unlikely to be 
resource constrained, but given their supply constraints, in terms of physical and 
human capital, the impact of increased expenditure may be relatively small. It is also 
open to debate whether military expenditure is the best form of government 
expenditure to use for expansionary growth (Dunne and Perlo-Freeman, 2003).  
 
•  Arms races: An arms race is normally considered as a dyadic action-reaction –
two countries each increasing their arms as a result of the other. The existence of 
arms races will mean that military spending will have a more marked effect on 
neighbours and other countries. Even if increases in military expenditure were to 
have a positive effect to start with this is unlikely to continue as the expenditure 
ratchets up. Some literature has emphasised wider form of arms races in cross 
section and panel –Rosh security web- and alliance effect and regional 
externalities
7 (Dunne et al, 2007). 
 
•  Identification: An important issue in empirical work is the identification problem 
that results from the fact that we observe military spending and growth changing 
and both are influenced by security threats. If the economic determinants of 
growth are constant, but there are variations in the security threat a negative 
relationship between military expenditure and output will be observed. On the 
other hand, if the threat is constant but the economic variables are changing a 
positive relationship between military expenditure and output will be observed. 
This can be used to explain some country experiences with different combinations 
of growth and military expenditure. It also suggests caution in interpreting the 
results of empirical studies (Smith, 2000). 
 
                                            
7 The security web concept is an attempt to capture the impact of changes in the security environment. This 
is done by defining a security web, neighbours and other countries that are either allies or present a threat 
and aggregating their military expenditures to form a security web variable.    8 
Clearly all of these channels will interact and their influence will vary depending on the 
countries involved. For example a relatively advanced developing countries, such as one 
of the Asian ‘tigers’ will have concerns over the industrial impact of their involvement in 
arms production, the technology and foreign direct investment benefits versus the 
opportunity cost, while a poorer African economy may be more concerned with the 
conflict trap they find themselves in.  
 
4. Summarising the Debate: Empirical Results 
 
Once we move beyond a broad stroke theoretical understanding towards an empirical 
analysis it becomes necessary to be more specific about the questions to be addressed and 
the way in which they are to be analysed. There are choices to be made many of which will 
be conditioned on the theoretical perspective adopted and the data availability
  and there has 
been some confusion within the literature as a result of not recognising such differences in 
the nature of studies and that the empirical results are likely to be very sensitive to the 
measurement and definition of the variables, to the specification of the estimated equations 
(especially the other variables included), the type of data used and the estimation method. In 
addition, the theoretical positions discussed above have generally been developed in the 
analysis of developed countries and applied to developing countries with some adjustments 
to the empirical model to take account of some of their particular features. This is hardly the 
best way to undertake such an analysis. The resulting variety of studies does make 
comparisons rather difficult and explain some of the seemingly contradictory findings. 
Whether or not the overall impact of military spending on development is positive or 
negative depends upon the relative magnitudes and signs of these channels and in the 
absence of any theoretical consensus, this can only be determined empirically.  
 
The debate in the empirical literature on the economic effects of military spending started 
with the contribution of Benoit (1973, 1978) which purported to show that military 
expenditure and development went hand in hand. This led to considerable research activity 
using econometric analysis to overcome the deficiencies, most of which has tended not to 
support Benoit, but there is still no consensus view. There were two responses to this, one to 
criticise the approach that Benoit took in looking at a number of countries and arguing that 
the complexities and specificities of the processes call for more detailed individual country 
case studies, introducing qualitative information (Ball, 1983; Kaldor, 1991). The second was 
to argue that Benoit’s empirical work was flawed and this led to a plethora of econometric 
studies. 
 
Some of the earlier contributions employed models that had both Keynesian and 
neoclassical features, within simultaneous equation systems. This approach emphasised the 
importance of the interdependence between military spending, growth and the other 
variables, with the majority of the studies tending to confirm the existence of negative 
impact of military expenditure on economic development. The studies did vary in their use 
of data. Some deal with cross section averages, others with time series estimates for 
individual countries, while others were more comprehensive (Dunne, 1996).  Attempts have 
been made to investigate sample stratifications. More recently, these types of modelling 
approaches have become rarer, but have not contradicted the earlier findings, with Gavlin   9 
(2003) in a cross section study of 64 developing countries using a simultaneous equation  
models, finding defence has a negative effect on growth and the savings-income ratio, the 
being greater for middle income countries.  
 
Another response was with empirical studies that used neoclassical single equation growth 
models, introducing military spending (burden, per capita or absolute value) as the, or one of 
the, independent variables. Looney and Frederiksen’s (1983a) re-examination of Benoit’s 
data in this manner divided the countries into resource constrained and not resource 
constrained and found the significant relation for military expenditure on growth only held 
for the resource unconstrained group. It was negative for the resource constrained. Other 
studies tended to find a positive or insignificant effect of military expenditure on growth, 
though there were studies that found negative effects (Dunne, 1996). More recently studies 
have tried to deal with some limitations of the earlier studies, some using extended growth 
models, including Knight et al (1996) who found that high levels of military spending 
detract from growth by reducing productive capital formation and distorting resource 
allocation. More recently Ram (2003) using a large panel of countries found no evidence of 
crowding out, but clear differences across groups of countries, while for a smaller number  
Yakovlev (2007) found military expenditure negatively related to economic growth. Given 
such heterogeneity he argued that care was needed in interpretation 
 
An important concern with the single equation approach was that it explicitly assumed that 
military expenditure is exogenously determined and that the causality goes from military 
expenditure to growth, both of which were brought into question by Joerding (1986). Other 
studies then investigated the causal links (using statistical definitions of causality referred to 
as "Granger causality" to distinguish the concept from theoretical causality) between 
military expenditure and economic growth, with, in general, the studies finding no dominant 
result. Some recent contributions have also tried to deal with the possibility that the 
milex/growth nexus may be more complicated that has been assumed with non linear 
relationships and different effects at different levels of expenditure. Given the complexity 
of such models the studies tend to focus on a small number of countries. Cuaresma et al 
(2004) estimate threshold regressions show that there is a level dependent effect of 
military spending on growth ie positive externality effect for low levels of military 
spending, but negative for high, while Pieroni (2008) finds a clear negative effect.  
 
Another concern of researchers was to allow for the opportunity cost of military spending, 
or the trade off between military spending and other forms of welfare expenditure. While 
this approach is somewhat problematic, as it suggests that if money was not spent on 
military spending it would be spent elsewhere and it often does not allow for the fact that it 
is possible to have more of both with economic growth, there have been some interesting 
studies, but no consensus. Some early studies found weak evidence of military spending 
crowding out spending on education and health in developing countries, but others found no 
evidence of trade offs. More recently, Aslam (2007) considered 59 developing countries and  
found little evidence of trade offs overall, but with some regional variation. 
  
An alternative to these types of studies was provided by the existence of large country 
macroeconometric models and other forms of world models, developed for other purposes,   10 
but able to be used to look at the impact of changes in military spending. The advantage of 
such models is that the impact of using military spending for other purposes can be 
analysed. A pioneering study by Leontief and Duchin (1980) used a world model to 
consider the effects of disarmament in the major powers and transference of the resources to 
low income countries, finding it to be positive, though not particularly significant. Cappelen 
et al (1982) made similar findings and Gleditsch et al (1996) provided a collection of 
studies, linked into the use of a world model to illustrate the clear benefits of the ‘peace 
dividend’. There are few individual country studies for developing countries using relatively 
large macromodels for obvious reasons.  Such analyses do differ from the usual studies of 
growth as they are no longer searching for the long run determinants of growth, but 
considering the short run ‘peace dividend’ impact, while at the same time allowing for 
government policy to adjust in a manner which deals with problems of economic 
adjustment. 
 
While developing countries have limited arms production capabilities, they do have some 
and many have aspirations to become important arms exporters. At the same time the 
trade in weapons is hugely important in providing foreign exchange for a limited number 
of countries, providing a drain on foreign exchange and debt burdens for a lot more, and 
providing the possibility of developing weapons production for others through offset 
deals. Brauer (2002) found that a number of formerly developing nations have 
"graduated" from relatively low levels and sophistication of arms production to relatively 
high level, coinciding with the continued development of their civilian industrial 
capabilities. Among the remaining developing nations between 25 and 35 were engaged 
in some form of arms production and arms (re)exports by the 1990s. Brauer argues that if 
anything, the development of indigenous arms industries in developing nations depends 
crucially on already established civilian capacities and that no one has ever presented a 
convincing case that arms exports provide net foreign-exchange. Dunne & Brauer (2004) 
is an edited collection that provides a range of studies on the role of offsets in development. 
They find virtually no case where offset arrangements have yielded unambiguous net 
benefits for a country’s economic development. As a general rule arms trade offset deals 
are seen to be more costly than ‘off-the-shelf’ arms purchases and to create little by way 
of new or sustainable employment. They do not appear to contribute in any substantive 
way to general economic development, and with very few exceptions do not result in 
significant technology transfers, not even within the military sector. 
 
As mentioned, for many countries arms procurement will need foreign exchange and this 
may well require borrowing. This has led to a number of studies on the effect of military 
spending has upon debt is clearly an empirical question and a number of studies have 
investigated it. Early work followed Brzoska (1983) in suggesting that the impact of high 
external borrowing due to defence on a country’s overall growth performance and 
resource allocation depends on the countries capacity of international borrowing. More 
recently Brzoska (2004) finds indebtedness due to arms imports had not increased as much 
during the 90s as it did during the 70s, increased commercialisation means that countries 
have to pay for weapons (they can no longer rely on military aid) and poor countries are less 
important as customers. Dunne et al (2004a) find military burden to have a positive effect on 
the share of external debt in GDP for a panel of 11 small industrialised economies.    11 
 
The post-Cold war era led to important changes in the nature of conflicts. The end of 
proxy wars and superpower involvement did not reduce conflict, but did reduce their 
intensity, and saw a dominance of civil or intra state wars. The nature of wars clearly 
changed with a blurred distinction between war and organised crime and while local the 
wars tended to have a transnational connection Kaldor (2006). There were fewer real 
military battles than in the past, but skirmishes and attacks on civilians. Collier and 
Hoffler produced a series of careful and detail empirical studies which looked at the 
cause of conflict and explanations for their continuation/duration. The results suggested 
that it was greed (often represented by the proportion of primary commodities in GDP 
and other such indicators) rather than grievance that explains civil wars. This work led to 
a lively debate, the result of which was to accept that grievance may be involved in 
starting conflicts, but that that they are likely to be captured by more economic concerns 
over time (Collier, 2007). 
 
Another issue of concern has been to understand what determines military spending in 
developing countries. Whether it is strategic or economic factors –because they feel they 
need to or because they can afford to. One possibility is that they respond to other 
countries and engage in arms races. There are a number of studies on arms races, but it is 
difficult to find compelling empirical evidence of arms races of the Richardsonian action-
reaction type between pairs of countries, though there is evidence of some interrelation. 
This is rather surprising, but linked to the problems of using empirical data to 
operationalise the models. They are clearly more suited to analyse situations in which 
countries are in conflict, such as India-Pakistan and are therefore of limited applicability. 
But more importantly they have failed to perform well empirically (Dunne & Smith, 2007).  
Dunne et al (2007) moved beyond dyadic arms races develop the Rosh (1988) idea of a 
security web, the aggregate military spending of enemies, allies and potential enemies, 
finding them to be important. More recent literature has recognise that whereas the arms 
races of the cold war opposed comparable actors, the new conflicts are asymmetrical, 
between countries with high technology weapons and the others (Dunne et al, 2007).  
 
Previous surveys of the military spending growth literature include Chan (1986), who found 
a lack of consistency in the results, Ram (1995) who reviewed 29 studies, concluding little 
evidence of a positive effect of defence outlays on growth, but that it was also difficult to 
say the evidence supported a negative effect. Dunne (1996) covering 54 studies concluded 
that military spending had at best no effect on growth and was likely to have a negative 
effect, certainly that there was no evidence of positive effects and Smith (2000) suggesting 
the large literature did not indicate any robust empirical regularity, positive or negative, 
though he thinks there is a small negative effect in the long run, but on e that requires 
considerably more sophistication to find. Smaldone (2006) in his review of Africa considers 
military spending relationships to be heterogeneous, elusive and complex, but feels that 
variations can be explained by intervening variables. They can be both positive and negative 
but are usually not pronounced, although the negative effects tend to be wider and deeper in 
Africa and most severe in countries experiencing legitimacy/security crisis and 
economic/budgetary constraints. 
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Overall, while there is no consensus on the economic effects of military spending the most 
common finding is that military burden has either no significant effect, or a negative effect 
on economic growth for developing countries. Summarising the result of  our survey of 103 
studies on the economic effects of military spending, where case studies refers to single or 
small groups of countries and the unclear category, implies mixed or insignificant results.   
 
Type    Total No.    %Positive   %Negative   %Unclear 
Cross country  63    19    38    43 
Case studies  40    20    35    45 
Total    103    20    37    43 
 
 
Almost 39% of the cross country studies and 35% of the case studies find a negative effect 
of military spending on growth, with only around 20% finding positive for bothe types of 
studies. As Hartley and Sandler (1995) pointed out, if we distinguish between the supply 
side models and those which have a demand side, there is more consistency in the results. 
Models allowing for a demand side and hence the possibility of crowding out investment 
tend to find negative effects, unless there is some reallocation to other forms of government 
spending, while those with only a supply side find positive, or positive but insignificant, 
effects. That the supply side models find a positive effect is not a surprise as the model is 
inherently structured to find such as result (Brauer, 2002).  Given this, the fact that over 40% 
find unclear results could be interpreted as providing further evidence against there being a 
positive impact of military spending on the economy. 
 
It is also worth noting that the military burden, share of military spending in GDP is 
relatively low in most developing countries (less than 2% for low income countries) 
relative to other components of GDP, such as health and education. As a result one might 
not expect to find a statistically significant effect on the path of national income, when 
there are so many other influences. Aside from when countries are engaged in conflict 
one might not expect to find significant impacts of arms transfers and military spending, 
which makes it interesting that so many do. 
 
This means that there is the potential for developing countries to cut military spending with, 
at worst, no harm to economic performance and, at best, higher economic growth. The 
macroeconometric modelling literature that allows evaluations of military spending to other 
forms of government spending does suggest that there are likely to be economic benefits. 
These benefits could depend upon sensible economic policies and support of the 





Military spending is an expenditure by governments that has influence beyond the 
resources it takes up, especially when it leads to or facilitates conflicts. While countries 
need some level of security to deal with internal and external threats, these have   13 
opportunity costs, as they prevent resources being used for other purposes that might 
improve the pace of development. Such issues are clearly important for the poorest 
economies.  
 
While there are problems with data on military expenditure, especially when attempting to 
make comparisons, all of the available data does suggest that the clear trend reduction in 
military spending after the end of the Cold War has ended. Military spending, aside from 
some important regional differences is on the increase and this raises important issues for 
the developing world. To consider what these issues are likely to be this paper has provided 
a review of research on the military expenditure-development nexus. As a starting point for 
a comparison of the empirical studies a survey of the methodological and theoretical issues 
was undertaken. There are a number of schools of thought but no consensus in these general 
theories on the impact of military spending on economic growth. Much of the empirical 
work has focused on Keynesian and neoclassical models and considers a number of 
channels by which military spending can effect growth. Whether or not it is positive is seen 
to be an empirical one.  
 
It is important to recognise the interdependence of the demand and supply side and to 
consider the determinants of military spending. The results of the empirical studies are 
mixed but do tend to suggest that in developing countries economic conditions are not the 
most important determinant of military burden.   
 
The empirical analyses of the economic effects of military spending, including arms 
transfers, suggests that the is little or no evidence for a positive effect on economic growth 
and that it is more likely to have a negative effect, or at best no significant impact at all. A 
range of approaches are used, with the studies finding positive effects (often insignificant 
ones) generally adopting a single equation estimation approach. Studies which have 
attempted to develop simultaneous models to allow for a variety of indirect effects have 
tended to find that military spending has a negative impact on growth. Some studies have 
investigated the statistical causality of military spending and economic growth but with no 
dominant result.  
 
Overall, these results suggest that reducing arms and military spending need not be costly 
and can contribute to, or at the very least provide the opportunity for, improved economic 
performance in developing countries. There are still problems, however, in countries 
moving to lower levels of military spending and benefiting, Support is likely to be required 
at a national and international level, including assistance from the developed world. 
 
In addition, there is not necessarily an automatic improvement in development as a result 
of arms and military spending reductions, it something that requires good governance, 
management and support (Brauer, 1990). An early influential study by Smith and Smith 
(1980) suggested that if there is a relationship between disarmament and development, it 
may be one that has to be constructed politically, not one that is pre-given by economic 
forces. It would appear from this survey that their conclusion remains relevant to the modern 
world.  
   14 
An interesting observation is that while the evidence from military expenditure to growth 
is weak (even if the link is negative), the opposite link is very strong: China and India in 
particular are engaged in an economic arms race of sorts because it is economic growth 
that without question generates the resources needed to feed the military; Japan managed 
to become a major military force, despite have a constitutional requirement to keep 
military spending below 1% of GDP –its economy grew so much that 1% became a lot of 
resources. The lesson might be that if you want to have any hope of becoming (militarily) 
strong, invest in the economy. Once states are economically strong, there is too much at 
stake to risk it in war and they may also gain security from developed economies if they 
become too important to the world economy to allow them to be invaded. The best way 
to true security may actually be through economic development. 
 
 
It seems unfortunate that after 25 years of work or so, the findings of the review should 
be so hedged. This is partly because of the problems of getting reliable data and possibly 
a hangover from Cold War debates that in some cases reflected political positions rather 
that the pursuit of quality research. But it also reflects the fact that military spending and 
arms transfers while more important than there share of resources might suggest, is still 
only a small part of any economy and can easily be swamped by other factors. As get 
more post Cold War data we can hopefully better distinguish the trends in the data and so 
provide more careful analyses of the contemporary world. Clealry, this is an important 
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Developing Nations’ Arms Producers/Exporters, ca. 1985-1995. 
 
        ACDA (1997)*          Brzoska (1995)*      Rana (1995)*   
 
Afghanistan   1994              Algeria          Argentina 
Argentina    all years            Argentina        Bangladesh 
Brazil      all years            Bangladesh       Brazil 
Cape Verde    1985              Bolivia          Chile 
Chile      all years            Brazil          China, PRC 
China, PRC  all years            Burkina-Faso      Cuba 
Cuba      1985, 1988, 1989        Burma          Dominican Republic 
Egypt      all except 1991, 1995      Cameroon        Egypt 
Ethiopia    1990              Chile          India 
Greece     all years            China, PRC      Iraq 
 
India      all except 1988, 1989, 1992   Columbia        Iran 
Indonesia    all except 1986, 1987      Dominican Republic   Libya 
Iraq      1985-1990            Egypt          Malaysia 
Iran      1991-1995            India          Mexico 
Jordan      1986-1989, 1994        Indonesia        Namibia 
North Korea  all years            Iraq          Nigeria 
Kuwait      1988, 1992           Iran          North Korea 
Libya      1985-1992            Ivory Coast       Pakistan 
Malaysia    1994, 1995           Libya          Peru 
Mali      1989              Malaysia        Philippines 
 
Mexico     all years            Mexico         South Africa 
Nicaragua    1992, 1995           Morocco        Saudi Arabia 
Nigeria     1986, 1989           Nigeria         Turkey 
Oman      1986              North Korea      Venezuela   19 
Pakistan    all years            Pakistan        Yugoslavia 
Panama    1992, 1993           Peru 
Philippines    1985, 1986           Philippines         
Saudi Arabia  all except 1990, 1991, 1993   Saudi Arabia 
South Africa  all years            South Africa 
Sudan      1986              Sri Lanka 
 
Syria      1986, 1992           Sudan 
Thailand    1988, 1989           Syria 
Turkey      all except 1986          Thailand 
Venezuela    1990              Venezuela 
Vietnam    1985, 1987, 1988, 1992      
Yugoslavia    1985-1991             
— Slovenia   1992, 1994, 1995         
Zimbabwe    1994 
 
For ACDA, "all years," refers to all years from 1985 to 1995; ACDA lists arms exporters; 
Brzoska lists only African, Asian, Latin American, and Middle Eastern nation, counting Turkey 
as "European"; Rana only lists producers of "small arms". Countries listed in bold typeface 
appear on all three lists. For simplicity, Brauer designated countries as "developing" when 
their  per  capita  GNP is  estimated  as  below  US$  9,700  in  1995,  i.e., those  countries  not 
classified as "high-income economies" by the World Bank (World Bank, 1997). This excludes 
arms  producers  once  considered  "developing  such  as  Israel,  South  Korea,  Taiwan, 
Singapore, Spain, and Portugal). East-Central and Southeast-Central European nations, i.e., 
erstwhile  satellites  and  republics  of  the  former  Soviet  Union  that  nowadays  would 
appropriately be designated as "developing" are also excluded  
 
 
Source: Brauer (2002)  
 
 
 
 
 
 